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The microservice architecture is an architectural style that structures an applica-
tion as a collection of fine-grained, self-contained, single-purpose, independently
deployable services. Being a young architecture style and a still-evolving one, all
aspects of the microservice architecture have not yet been thoroughly analysed
in academic literature, especially compared to the fair amount of professional lit-
erature that exists on the subject. Hence, the grey literature provides a valuable
resource for understanding the microservice architecture and gaining insight into
current practices.
Practitioners adopt the microservice architecture to tackle the problems of the
monolithic architecture, including security issues. However, the microservice ar-
chitecture is not a silver bullet and brings its own challenges. Adopting the
microservice architecture changes the way security needs to be approached. Mi-
croservices have very particular security needs, different from those of a mono-
lithic application, that must be accommodated. This thesis explores these needs
and looks into strategies for satisfying them.
Both the edge of the microservice application and the communication between
microservices within the application need to be secured. Securing the application
at the edge should not cause developers to downplay the importance of securing
each microservice at the service-level and working towards adopting zero-trust
security principles, which evidently gain popularity in the industry. In the thesis,
we discuss end-user and service-to-service access control both at the edge of the
deployment and the edge of the service.
Finally, we describe the first step of the incremental process of migrating a mono-
lithic application securely to microservices. We apply the strangler fig migration
pattern and extract the identity microservice from the monolith. We evaluate
the security of the resulting architecture based on the discoveries presented in
the earlier chapters of the thesis.
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The microservice architecture is an architectural style inspired by the princi-
ples of domain-driven design (DDD), particularly by the concept of bounded
context [60]. A microservice is a fine-grained, self-contained, single-purpose,
independently deployable unit [61]. Together, microservices form a logically
complete microservice application.
Practitioners adopt the microservice architecture to encourage team au-
tonomy and ownership, reduce time to market, scale up and down cost-
effectively, enable DevOps, and embrace new technologies. Apart from these
real benefits, following the mainstream is a common motivation for adopting
the microservice architecture [50, 74].
Tech giants like Netflix and Lyft are not only building their products on
top of the microservice architecture but also impact the industry by sharing
the insights of how they build their products in blog posts, white papers, and
public talks as well as by making their technologies, such as the following,
available as open-source:
• Netflix went open source with Zuul, a gateway service that provides
dynamic routing, monitoring, resiliency, and security, and several other
technologies that power microservices1.
• Lyft is a company behind Envoy, an open-source edge and service proxy,
which works with the Istio and Consul Connect service meshes [16].
However, despite the strong industry presence, all aspects of the microser-
vice architecture have not yet been thoroughly analysed in academic liter-
ature. The existing academic research on the topic mainly comprises sec-
ondary studies and surveys. At the same time, there is a wealth of grey
1Netflix Open Source Software Center. URL: https://netflix.github.io/
(visited on 10/10/2020)
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literature on microservices [68]. This gap between academic research and
the industrial grey literature becomes even more pronounced when the topic
of microservices is narrowed down. There is even less thorough academic
research that focuses specifically on the topic of microservice security. At
the same time, microservices have particular security needs, different from
those of a monolithic application, that must be satisfied.
1.1 Scope, Aim and Objectives
The scope of the thesis is microservice security or, more precisely, the partic-
ular security needs of microservices and industry best practices for meeting
those needs, and possible gaps and unsolved problems. The thesis focuses on
architectural choices and trade-offs, as opposed to details of implementation.
The aim is to deepen understanding of the challenges and opportunities
for microservice security. The thesis has two objectives:
1. The first objective is to undertake an exploratory study to highlight the
challenges for security posed by adopting the microservice architecture,
explore architectural patterns and strategies that address these chal-
lenges, and reveal other, possibly unsolved problems.
2. The second objective focuses on refactoring a real-life monolithic appli-
cation to microservices and assessing the results from the perspective
of the theoretical foundation established in Objective 1.
1.2 Outline
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 defines monolithic
and microservice architectures, discusses the benefits and drawbacks of the
two architectural styles, and presents relevant architectural patterns and ac-
cess control models. Chapter 3 lists the specific challenges of securing mi-
croservices. Chapter 4 discusses securing public traffic to a microservice
deployment, particularly enforcing security policies at the edge of the de-
ployment and restricting access to underlying services which the consumer
should not access directly. Chapter 5 defines and justifies the concept of zero
trust security and discusses securing private traffic within a microservice de-
ployment by encrypting the traffic and verifying claims that microservices
make about both the end-user and themselves. Chapter 6 describes the pro-
cess of migrating a monolithic application to the microservice architecture
with a focus on the security aspects of the new architecture and gives an
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evaluation of the process and results. Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the
work and discusses open problems and future work.
Chapter 2
Background
This chapter gives background on microservices as an architectural style.
It begins by assessing the gains and costs of monolithic and microservice
architectures. After this, the chapter discusses the challenges of securing
microservices found in academic and grey literature. It continues with a
discussion of architectural patterns for securing microservices and their im-
plementations. Afterwards, the chapter describes and compares two types of
access tokens. Finally, it ends with a presentation of several access control
models.
2.1 Monolith to Microservices
This section defines monolithic and microservice architectures, assesses the
gains and costs of adopting one or the other, and identifies the motivations
for migrating a monolith to microservices.
2.1.1 Everything Wrong with Monoliths
Even though a monolithic application can comprise several parts, such as
presentation, business logic and data tiers in a three-tier architecture, it is
built and deployed as a single unit [5]. While a monolithic application is a
suitable choice for a smaller application, it suffers from several issues that
become more evident as the monolith grows:
A. Codebase complexity
As a monolith grows, the complexity of the codebase increases, while
the quality of the codebase declines over time. This results in challenges
4
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for understanding and navigating the codebase and ultimately leads to
more security bugs and vulnerabilities [15]. However, sound development
practices such as producing clean and maintainable code, conducting peer
reviews, and writing documentation help foster security by reducing the
complexity of a large codebase [64].
B. Interconnectivity and interdependency
Since the parts of a monolith are interconnected and interdependent, a
single change in a monolith might start a chain reaction of unrelated test
failures for non-obvious reasons, thus requiring additional changes that
must be coordinated across different parts of the monolith [81]. A single
change in one part of the monolith might cause a bug or vulnerability in
another part of the monolith, which may remain undetected by tests [5].
C. Steep learning curve
It might take months for a new developer joining a team to become
effective and comfortable with making their first non-trivial contribution.
For example, before Shopify decomposed their monolithic system into
microservices, a new developer on the shipping team would have also
needed to learn how orders are created, how payments are processed,
and more [81].
D. “Dependency hell”
A large number of dependencies makes it challenging to update a com-
ponent if there are other parts of the system that directly or indirectly
depend on an incompatible older version of the component. An update
may result in an inconsistent system that does not build, run, or behave
as intended [15].
E. Slow development cycles and considerable downtimes
Even the smallest change in a single component of a monolith requires
that the whole application is rebuilt, retested and redeployed, which
might result in considerable downtimes [5, 15, 72]. Moreover, a large
codebase slows down an IDE, which further slows down the process of
development.
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F. One-size-fits-all configuration
Individual components of a monolith might have varying resource and
technology requirements. As a result, while designing and configuring a
monolith, the developer must settle for a solution which might be sub-
optimal with respect to every component [15].
G. Limited scalability
Different components of a monolith might have different scaling require-
ments. It could be that some components receive more inbound requests
than others. To deal with an increase in traffic, the entire monolithic
application needs to be replicated. This wastes resources and limits scal-
ability [15, 72].
H. Technology lock-in
It is not easy to adopt new technologies in a monolith and evolve its
components independently [15, 72]. For example, it took a team of four
full-time engineers plus additional volunteers a year and a half to upgrade
monolithic GitHub from Rails 3.2 to Rails 5.2 [77].
2.1.2 The “Why” of the Microservice Architecture
A microservice application is comprised of fine-grained, self-contained, single-
purpose, independently deployable units [61]. Each microservice runs within
its own process and includes everything needed to operate independently,
such as its own persistent storage [5, 15, 60].
Within a microservice deployment, microservices interact with one an-
other using IPC protocols such as HTTP, message-based AMQP and STOMP,
or binary TCP and UDP [76]. While the choice of the appropriate protocol
depends on the nature of each microservice, microservices must be aware of
what protocols they can use to interact with other microservices [60].
Richardson lists a few different microservice deployment patterns, which
are Deploying a Service as a Virtual Machine, Deploying a Service as a
Container, and Serverless Deployment [61]. A container-based microservice
deployment is a common approach to streamline the DevOps process [29].
Containers are more lightweight than VMs but do not have the significant
limitations of a serverless deployment. The figures from a 2018 report by
Datadog show a steady increase in the adoption of container technologies
such as Docker [1]. To limit the scope of the thesis, hereinafter, it is assumed
that each service is packaged as a container image, and each service instance
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runs in its own container. The term “container” refers to a Docker container
unless otherwise specified.
The microservice architecture provides the means for overcoming the dis-
advantages of the monolithic architecture described earlier in this chapter.
Below are the respective advantages and, if applicable, disadvantages of the
microservice architecture:
A. Failure isolation and independent life cycles
The narrow focus of each microservice helps to keep the codebase rela-
tively small and essentially narrow the search area for a bug [15]. Further-
more, every microservice can evolve at its pace, have its own repository
and continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) pipeline, and be
deployed in a different cloud provider. However, whilst the microser-
vice architecture fosters simplicity and eases maintainability of individ-
ual components, it introduces additional network complexity, especially
as the number of microservices grows. As discussed further in Chapter 3,
this complexity brings additional challenges for, inter alia, security.
B. Independence
Microservices have clear boundaries; they are independently deployable
and operationally independent of one another. This independence min-
imises the risk of side effects of making a code change in the microservice
on the others [5, 9], and it allows the developer to run tests on the mi-
croservice in isolation from the rest of the system [15] and to run more
comprehensive regression tests than in a larger monolithic application
[59]. However, to achieve this independence, each microservice must ad-
here to a well-defined, versioned API contract and support the previous
versions until no other microservice relies on those particular versions of
the API contract.
C. Swift learning
The developer can make a non-trivial code change without knowing how
other microservices are implemented. In contrast to the previous example
with Shopify, if shippings, orders and payments are each handled by a
different microservice, the developer on the shipping team would not have
to take time to understand the internals of the two other microservices.
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D. Gradual rollouts and continuous updates
A new version of a microservice can be rolled out gradually, and two or
more versions of the same microservice can exist in parallel. This way,
other microservices can gradually move to a newer version [15].
E. Brief redeployment downtimes and seamless rollouts
Changing a single microservice requires that this microservice alone is re-
built and redeployed, as opposed to the entire system. Due to the small
size of a microservice, this results in brief redeployment downtimes [15]
and, in case of failure, only a part of the whole system will be affected [5].
There are a few commonly used deployment patterns for updating a run-
ning microservice to a newer version that typically consider achieving zero
downtime, minimising the impact of deployment incidents and failures,
and yielding reliable, predictable, and repeatable deployments [4]:
• In a rolling update deployment, the new version is gradually rolled
out to subsets of running microservice instances until it has com-
pletely replaced the old version. A slow, gradual rollback is the
main consideration of a rolling update deployment.
• In a blue/green deployment, the new version is released alongside
the old version, and traffic is switched to the new version once it has
been tested. An instant rollback is the key benefit of a blue-green
deployment; however, it requires maintaining the blue and green
environments simultaneously, which carries cost implications.
F. Service-specific configuration and freedom to choose the right
technology
The microservice architecture is typically a heterogeneous, polyglot ar-
chitecture. It promotes different microservices in a system to pick the
technology stack depending on the nature and needs of the microservice
as well as other factors such as price and familiarity with the technol-
ogy [60]. Moreover, each microservice can have a separate environment
configuration based on its specific needs [15].
G. Cost-effective scalability
Typically, different parts of a complex application have different scaling
requirements. Microservices can scale at different rates to respond to
varying load conditions. Instead of adding and removing instances of the
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entire application, only the microservices that are under heavy load can
be scaled up [5, 15]. Based on performance tests, Villamizar et al. con-
clude that the adoption of the microservice architecture can help reduce
up to 13 percent of infrastructure costs [79]. By deploying microservices
within a serverless architecture with AWS Lambda, Google Cloud Func-
tions or Azure Functions, the infrastructure costs can be reduced by up
to 77 percent, according to Villamizar et al. [79], or by 90 percent or
more, according to Singleton [65].
H. No technology lock-in
Developers are free to choose the suitable technology stack to implement
a microservice [9, 15] and to replace the existing microservice with a new
microservice built with a different technology stack, as long as the new
microservice adheres to the same API contract as the old one [5, 9, 82].
The only constraints are imposed by the service-to-service communica-
tion mechanisms [15].
2.2 Microservice Patterns
One approach to building a microservice application is to use a direct client-
to-microservice communication architecture in which each microservice pro-
vides a public entry point that clients can access directly, without middle-
boxes [61, 76]. However, while suitable for a small system, the direct client-
to-microservice architecture is rarely used in practice [61] and considered an
anti-pattern as the number of microservices increases [73]. This is due to the
following reasons:
Increase in the number of round trips
Microservices typically provide fine-grained APIs. Should the consum-
ing application need to make multiple requests to multiple microservice
APIs as part of one higher-level operation, the total number of round
trips between the consuming application and the microservice applica-
tion increases [61, 76]. This results in higher latency, especially if the
servers are geographically remote from the client.
Coupling between consumers and microservices
The client application directly depends on the microservice APIs and
the internal architecture of the microservice application, which compli-
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cates the client application code and increases the cost of introducing
breaking changes to the API contracts and the internal architecture, for
example, while refactoring microservices [61, 76]. The rawness of mi-
croservice APIs caused by prioritising scalability and robustness above
the API design best practices also does not make them ideal for external
exposure [67].
Client-unfriendly protocols used by the services
Microservices may need to use IPC mechanisms that cannot be easily
consumed by the client application. These include HTTP-based gRPC
or message-based AMQP and STOMP. Without protocol translation, the
choice of IPC mechanisms is limited to client- and firewall-friendly ones
such as HTTP-based REST and WebSockets.
Poor defence-in-depth
Regardless of the size of the application, the direct client-to-microservice
communication has security limitations: without a gatekeeper, the inter-
nal network of the application is exposed to unauthenticated or unau-
thorised requests [61].
This section discusses three architectural patterns that help address the
above-listed limitations, including their description, use cases, benefits and
drawbacks, and implementations that are in use today.
2.2.1 API Gateway Pattern
Figure 2.1: API gateway pattern
The API gateway pattern is the most common microservice architec-
tural patterns found in microservices, as evidenced by a study of open-source
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projects [46]. An ingress API gateway is a service that typically sits behind
the firewall in the data centre and acts as a single point of entry into an ap-
plication from the internet outside the firewall. It is responsible for request
routing and composition, protocol translation, and handling cross-cutting
concerns [61]:
Request routing and composition
An API gateway acts primarily as a reverse proxy, routing requests from
the clients to the microservices behind it. Upon receiving a request from
the client, an API gateway forwards it to the designated microservice
based on the client IP address, server port number, request headers, or
requested URL, and returns the response from the microservice to the
client.
However, unlike a reverse proxy, an API gateway can also act as an
aggregator and not only route a request from the client to the corre-
sponding microservice but also invoke multiple microservices and aggre-
gate the results into a single response. API composition addresses two
of the above-mentioned limitations of the direct client-to-microservice
communication architecture.
Firstly, providing the clients with a coarse-grained API reduces the
number of round trips between the consuming application and the mi-
croservice application.
Secondly, request routing and composition at the API gateway de-
couples the clients from the microservices. However, request aggregation
comes with a risk of coupling between the gateway and microservices.
A variation of the API gateway pattern is the backend for frontend
pattern. It suggests having multiple API gateways to accommodate the
unique needs of every client application and to simplify the client appli-
cations by moving the aggregation logic into an application-specific API
gateway accessed through its own API.
Protocol and data interchange format translation
Microservices interact with one another using a large variety of IPC mech-
anisms. Depending on the nature of each microservice and whether
the interaction is synchronous or asynchronous, microservices can ei-
ther use synchronous IPC mechanisms, such as HTTP-based REST and
gRPC [25], or asynchronous IPC mechanisms, such as HTTP-based Web-
Sockets and message-based AMQP and STOMP. Likewise, microservices
can use a wide range of data interchange formats, such as text-based
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JSON and XML or binary Protocol Buffers [57]. An API gateway can
translate between the protocols used internally by the microservices and
client- and firewall-friendly protocols such as HTTP and WebSockets [61,
76].
Offloading cross-cutting concerns
In addition to request routing, composition, and protocol translation, an
API gateway often handles cross-cutting concerns that are shared across
multiple microservices. These include authentication and authorisation,
rate limiting, throttling, retry policies, circuit breaking, logging and mon-
itoring, caching, and other concerns.
Abstracting cross-cutting concerns and implementing them in a single
place such as an API gateway lowers the complexity of the application
and improves its maintainability.
API gateways can also be layered in front of each other and implement
different operational concerns for a cleaner separation of concerns [63].
However, this incurs an increase in latency due to one or more extra
network hops.
While the API gateway pattern resolves many of the above-listed issues of a
direct client-to-microservices architecture, it also creates a potential develop-
ment bottleneck since routing and aggregation rules may have to be updated
following a change to the microservice APIs before the client can get the up-
date. Likewise, the API gateway is a potential single point of failure, and it
must be able to handle the load and scale up appropriately. Finally, having
an API gateway creates an additional network hop between the client and
microservice.
The availability of technologies for implementing API gateway predates
the rise of the microservice architecture. Below is a reasonably inclusive list
of widely used L4 and L7 proxies and API gateways:
• L4 and L7 proxies NGINX, HAProxy, Envoy, Traefik,
• API gateways Zuul, Kong, Tyk, Ocelot, Ambassador,
• API gateways as a service Amazon API Gateway and Azure API Man-
agement.
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2.2.2 Sidecar Pattern
Figure 2.2: Sidecar and sidecar proxy patterns
A sidecar is a container that runs alongside another container, which
runs the main microservice and is sometimes referred to as the main car.
The main car can have multiple sidecars [67]. The containers are co-located
and co-scheduled on the same physical or virtual machine via an atomic
group of containers such as a Kubernetes pod [8]. A pod is the smallest unit
of deployment in Kubernetes that encapsulates one or more containers [38].
Every container in a pod shares network and storage resources and the same
lifecycle, i.e., a sidecar is always created and retired alongside the main car.
The purpose of a sidecar is to improve or augment the functionality of
the main car. For example, the sidecar can act as a service proxy to the
main car and implement rate limiting, throttling, logging, tracing, protocol
translation, security, and other cross-cutting concerns. Several sidecar proxy
implementations exist, with Envoy Proxy being one of the dominant ones [16].
The sidecar pattern helps to reduce development effort by moving shared
functionality out of each microservice and into a sidecar [60]. This also
allows for a clearer separation of concerns between the core functionality of
a microservice and common functionality shared by microservices [63].
However, running an extra sidecar container within each pod increases
the resource cost of a microservice deployment, which becomes problematic
as the number of microservices and sidecar proxies grows [63].
Containers within a pod can communicate with each other using localhost
or standard IPC mechanisms such as named pipes, message queues, or shared
memory [38]. While these are faster than remote communication between
containers that are not co-located and co-scheduled, communication between
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containers in the same pod is still slower than language-level function and
method calls [8].
2.2.3 Service Mesh Pattern
Figure 2.3: Service mesh pattern
A service mesh is a configurable, low-latency infrastructure layer that
mediates ingress and egress traffic that flows to and from each microservice,
secures the traffic with a network security protocol like TLS, and handles
various cross-cutting concerns, such as distributed tracing, circuit breaking,
service discovery, and rule-based load balancing and traffic routing [61, 76].
A service mesh is logically split into a data plane and a control plane [76]:
• The data plane is typically comprised of a network of sidecar proxies
that run in each pod alongside the main car. Each sidecar proxy routes
or proxies ingress and egress traffic to and from the microservice to
which it is attached.
• The control plane is a set of APIs and tools used to manage and con-
figure the proxies across the service mesh.
Table 2.1 summarises four widely used open-source service mesh imple-
mentations based on the technologies they employ. All the service meshes
listed in the table support TLS, HTTP/1.1, HTTP/2 and gRPC protocols
and mTLS for mutual authentication. All except Linkerd2 also provide built-
in authorisation features [11, 30, 40, 43].
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Table 2.1: Comparing service mesh implementations
2.3 Access Tokens
Various types of access tokens are commonly used in the microservice archi-
tecture for tasks such as authenticating users and services and securely trans-
mitting information about the user or service. The specifics of how access
tokens can be used in these tasks are discussed further in Chapters 4 and 5.
This section presents an overview of two types of access tokens, opaque and
transparent tokens.
Opaque tokens
An opaque token, also called reference token, is a handle that refers to a
record stored in the persistent storage of the issuing service. It is typ-
ically represented by a plain UUID, as defined in RFC 4122 [41]. The
UUID is a sequence of 128 bits represented as a lower-case hexadecimal
string consisting of a group of 8 digits followed by three groups of 4 digits
followed by a group of 12 digits, with the groups separated by hyphens.
The UUID offers no security features for verifying the authorship of the
token, nor can it explicitly contain information about the user or service.
To validate an opaque UUID token and retrieve information about the
user or service, the recipient of the token must invoke the service that
issued the token, which reduces both performance — due to one or more
extra network hops to the issuing service — and availability as the recip-
ient of the token cannot proceed with the request before the token has
been validated.
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Transparent tokens
A transparent token, also called self-contained token, on the other hand,
is capable of containing information about the user which the recipient
of the token can read without invoking the issuing service. It is typically
expressed as a JSON Web Token (JWT).
JWT is a compact and self-contained claims representation format for
transmitting information between parties as a JSON object in a cryp-
tographically safe manner, as defined in RFC 7519 [33]. A claim is a
statement about a subject represented as a name-value pair and asserted
by some entity such as a Security Token Service (STS).
A set of claims can be digitally signed or integrity protected and
encrypted. A digitally signed JWT consists of three Base64-encoded
sections separated by two periods:
• Header is a Base64-encoded JSON object that typically contains
the type of the token and the signing algorithm. The type of the
token is specified in the “typ” parameter. It is recommended that
its value be set to “JWT”. The signing algorithm is specified in the
“alg” parameter, as defined in the JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)
specification [31].
• Payload is a Base64-encoded JSON object that that contains a set
of claims. RFC 7519 defines a set of predefined claims, referred
to as registered claims, which encode identity and metadata and
are recommended for interoperability. These include “iss” (issuer),
“exp” (expiration time), “sub” (subject), and “aud” (audience).
• Signature provides integrity protection and source authentication.
JSON Web Signature (JWS) is defined in RFC 7515 [32].
JWTs are not dependant on any specific technology stack, meaning
that they can be used in the polyglot microservice architecture since
many implementations of JWT exist.
Table 2.2 presents a comparison of UUID tokens and digitally signed JWTs.
It reflects the current industry preference for JWTs, which are considered
to have more sophisticated security features and offer greater flexibility in
striking balance between security and performance.
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UUID tokens Digitally signed JWTs
Performance Information about the user
or service must be retrieved
from the issuing service
Explicitly contain informa-
tion about the end-user
Expiration Only if implemented in the
issuing service
Built-in
Revocation Only if implemented in the
issuing service
Only if implemented in the
issuing service AND the re-
cipient validates the token
by invoking the issuing ser-
vice
Integrity No Built-in
Table 2.2: Comparing UUID tokens and JWTs
2.4 Access Control Models
Access control (AC) is the process of permitting or restricting access to re-
sources only to privileged entities based on a defined AC policy. An AC
policy is a set of rules that define the conditions under which access may
take place, which can be formally presented as an AC model. An AC model
links an AC policy and mechanism [27]. An AC mechanism is an implemen-
tation of an AC model. The primary role of an AC mechanism is to receive
an access request, reach an access decision, and enforce this decision [28].
An AC mechanism might include all or some of the following integrated or
separate core components:
• policy administration point (PAP), where policy administrators and
developers define AC policies [17, 54];
• policy decision point (PDP), where policy decisions are made [17, 54,
80];
• policy enforcement point (PEP), where the policy decisions are en-
forced [17, 54, 80];
• policy information point (PIP), from where the PDP can load external
data [17, 80];
• policy retrieval point (PRP), from where the PDP can load AC poli-
cies [17, 80].
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2.4.1 Access Control Lists
An access control list (ACL) is a list of access control entries (ACE) at-
tached to a resource. Each ACE identifies the user and specifies access modes
granted to the user.
2.4.2 Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC), as formalised by Ferraiolo and Kuhn [19],
is a policy-independent identity-based access control model that exploits the
notions of users, roles and permissions. RBAC establishes many-to-many
role-permission, user-role, and role-role relations. Each user is assigned one
or more roles, and each role is assigned one or more permissions. The 1993
NIST study by Ferraiolo et al. concludes that role-permission relations tend
to be more permanent than user-role relations [18]. Roles can have inheri-
tance, mutual exclusion, and other relations. Through these relations, RBAC
directly supports the principles of least privilege, separation of duties, and
data abstraction [62]. Least privilege ensures that users and roles are assigned
the absolute minimum permissions necessary. Separation or segregation of
duties ensures that no user or role is assigned all necessary permissions to
perform a malicious act. Data abstraction ensures the reduction of the spe-
cific read, write, execute permissions to abstract permissions.
2.4.3 Attribute-Based Access Control
The RBAC model has several known limitations. Firstly, it provides coarse-
grained AC while many applications require finer-grained AC [58]. Secondly,
it makes decisions based on the statically assigned roles and ignores the
dynamically changing context. Attribute-based access control (ABAC) over-
comes these limitations of RBAC. It leverages contextual attributes asso-
ciated with the requesting user, requested object and current environment
[58]. Policy rules are specified in the form of Boolean expressions consist-
ing of contextual attributes. Access is granted if the expression is true and
denied otherwise.
ABAC can be seen as a generalisation of ACL and RBAC models that
employ the identity and role attributes accordingly [28]. ABAC is typically
more complex than RBAC in terms of policy review; hence ensuring the
validity of a policy and reviewing or modifying user permissions may not
be practically feasible [12]. As a result, there have been multiple efforts to
integrate RBAC and ABAC models to combine the advantages offered by
each model [12, 39, 58].
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ABAC policies can be implemented with the Open Policy Agent and
Speedle+ AC engines as well as with several AC engines that implement the
XACML standard:
Open Policy Agent
Open Policy Agent (OPA) is an open-source, lightweight, general-purpose
policy engine that allows to define fine-grained AC policies and offload
the enforcement of these policies to a different location. That is, OPA
decouples policy decision making and enforcement [54].
OPA policies are written in Rego, its own high-level declarative lan-
guage. Rego supports variables; basic arithmetic, comparison, and logical
expressions; aggregate functions for summarising complex types such as
objects, arrays, and sets; and rules. Rules are if-then logic statements
that can either be partial or complete. Partial rules generate a set of
values and assign it to a variable. Complete rules assign a single value
to a variable and can be regarded as a special case of partial rules. In
addition to ABAC policies, Rego is suitable for defining ACL and RBAC
policies.
OPA can be deployed as a Docker container. The OPA server exposes
a REST API that the PEP can query to check authorisation.
OPA supports integration with Kubernetes, Istio, Kafka, Terraform
and multiple other projects.
Speedle+
Speedle+ is an open-source, general-purpose policy engine. Similarly to
OPA, it allows to define fine-grained AC policies and decouple decision
making and enforcement of these policies [69].
Speedle+ policies are written in its own Security Policy Definition
Language (SPDL), which can describe both RBAC and ABAC policies.
Speedle+ supports integration with Docker, Kubernetes and Istio.
XACML
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is an open stan-
dard for expressing security policies developed by the Organization for
the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS) [17].
The XACML standard introduces an XML-based policy language and
an XML-based schema for authorisation requests and responses. The
latest version of the standard, XACML 3.0, was released in 2013.
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2.4.4 Capability-Based Access Control
A capability is an unforgeable handle for a resource coupled with a set of per-
missions to access that resource. As opposed to RBAC and ABAC models,
capability-based access control (CBAC) model is a non-identity-based AC
model. Instead of conveying the identity of a user, from which the permis-
sions available to the particular user can be determined, a capability directly
communicates the permissions [45]. The use of capability tokens, which are
scoped to an individual resource, provides the finest-grained AC among the
three AC models, thus adhering tightly to the principle of least privilege. In
addition, capabilities decrease the risk of a confused deputy attack [26].
For accountability reasons, an application may need to authenticate the
user in addition to authorising the request. Capabilities can be combined
with identities either by tying the identity of the user to each capability
token or by using a separate authentication mechanism to identify the user
in addition to requiring a capability token to authorise the request. However,
the first approach is only suitable when a capability token is short-lived and
intended for a single user. Sharing such capability token with other users
would allow them to impersonate the user whose identity is associated with
the capability token.
CBAC is intended for fine-grained authorisation and delegation of access
to individual resources in decentralised, distributed systems. However, there
is no evidence of widespread use of CBAC in web API security, despite the
steady increase in the adoption of microservices which are distributed by
nature.
RBAC ABAC CBAC
Fine-grained No Yes Yes
Context-aware No Yes Yes
Easily reviewable Yes No No
Easily modifiable Yes No NA
Identity-based Yes Yes No




In many aspects, the security of the microservice architecture is no differ-
ent from that of the monolithic architecture. A microservice application is
susceptible to the same set of attacks as traditional monolithic applications,
including L3/L4 attacks such as network-layer denial-of-service (DoS) and
distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks and L7 attacks such as cross-
site scripting (XSS), cross-site request forgery (CSRF/XSRF), SQL injec-
tions, and application-layer DoS/DDoS attacks. However, the distributed
nature of the microservice architecture poses specific security challenges that
do not exist or are greatly attenuated in the monolithic architecture.
A significant portion of academic research on microservice security com-
prises works that aim to identify the challenges of securing microservices. To
summarise and systematise these security challenges, microservice security is
commonly divided into layers:
• Yarygina and Bagge identify six progressive layers inspired by the OSI
model. These are the hardware, virtualisation, cloud, communication,
application and orchestration layers [83].
• Yu et al. define four aspects of microservice security: containers, data,
permission, and network [84].
• Nehme et al. divide their security model into four broad dimensions:
the microservices themselves, application architecture, underlying in-
frastructure, and external interfaces [48].
• Google describes the security of their technical infrastructure in six
different progressive layers. These are hardware infrastructure, service
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deployment, user identity, storage services, internet communication and
operational security [24].
The following chapter gives an overview of the challenges that are specific
to the microservice architecture. We omit those challenges that affect both
monolithic and microservice applications with equal strength. In terms of
the classification introduced by Yarygina and Bagge, we focus on the up-
per communication, application, and orchestration layers and omit the lower
hardware, virtualisation, and cloud layers.
3.1 Protecting Larger Attack Surface
In a monolithic application, components either run on a single process and
use language-level function and method calls to invoke one another [67] or
use IPC mechanisms, such as files, signals, sockets and pipes, to exchange
data among two or more threads in one or more processes [15]. As a result,
a monolithic application typically has few entry points.
On the other hand, in a microservice application, microservices communi-
cate over the network. Each microservice exposes one or more entry points to
the network, which significantly increases the overall number of entry points
and, consequently, expands the attack surface [53, 67]. Since the application
as a whole is only as protected as its weakest point, all the entry points must
be equally secured [66, 67]. In addition to securing all the entry points, the
integrity and confidentiality of the data in transit must be protected [15].
Chapter 4 discusses reducing the attack surface by enforcing perimeter
security, and Chapter 5 discusses securing all the entry points by enforcing
zero trust security.
3.2 Striking Balance Between Security and
Performance
While the security checks in a monolithic application are typically done only
once, in a microservice application, they must be done repeatedly at every
entry point as the request propagates through multiple microservices. These
repetitive and redundant security checks can have a strong negative impact
on the performance of the application [60, 67]. Moreover, these security
checks may require that microservices send a request to a remote identity
service. Remote calls take longer than language-level function and method
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calls. This can further increase latency, resulting in an even more significant
performance drop [67].
Alternatively, the security checks can be done once at the edge of the mi-
croservice application. As the number of security checks decreases from many
to one, the performance of the application improves accordingly. However,
this approach assumes that the private network is trusted, which contradicts
the principles of zero trust networking and is perceived as an antipattern
with the industry shifting towards service mesh solutions [67].
The perceived performance of an application impacts the user experience.
Nielsen states that a delay of fewer than 100 milliseconds feels instant to the
user, and a delay of between 100 and 1,000 milliseconds is perceptible but
does not interrupt the conscious thought process of the user, while a delay of
more than 1,000 is likely to cause the user to context-switch [51]. Such long
delays are found to reduce user engagement and conversion rates:
• Based on a set of bounce and conversions data from mobile devices,
Google predicts that as page load time goes from 1,000 milliseconds to
3,000 milliseconds, the probability of the user leaving increases by 32
percent [2].
• BBC reports that 10 percent of their users leaving for every 1,000-
millisecond increase in the page load time [10].
• Pinterest reports a 15 percent increase in the number of visits and
sign-ups after a 40-percent reduction in the user-perceived load time
[47].
Besides this, low latency becomes increasingly critical in workloads such
as intelligent transportation and traffic systems, autonomous vehicles, and
virtual and augmented reality. As a result, the trade-off between security and
performance should be considered when integrating security into the design
[67] and deciding on the appropriate level of service granularity [60].
Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate the ramifications of integrating security into a
microservice application for the performance of the application and discuss
how they can be overcome.
3.3 Establishing Trust Between
Microservices
It only takes one compromised microservice to put the whole microservice
deployment in jeopardy. To reduce the trust put on individual microservices
and limit the potential damage, zero trust security model can be adopted.
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The zero trust principles include protecting the data in transit with TLS,
adhering to the principle of least privilege through service-to-service authen-
tication and fine-grained access control, and monitoring service-to-service
interactions. Protecting the data in transit and authenticating one microser-
vice to another involves provisioning of keys and certificates to microservices,
key revocation, key rotation, and key use monitoring.
3.4 Sharing User Context
All the components of a monolithic application share the same web session
and the identity of the end-user is retrieved from it. In comparison, mi-
croservices generally do not share resources 1. Therefore, the identity of the
end-user must be explicitly passed between microservices [61, 67].
In a zero trust security model, a microservices must not trust whatever
another microservice claims about the end-user. Therefore, the identity of
the end-user must be verifiable.
Several methods for passing the identity of the end-user from one mi-
croservice to another, along with their benefits and drawbacks, are discussed
further in Section 5.1.
3.5 Managing Policies and Secrets
As a best practice for operating containers, the container image has to be
immutable for a safe, reliable, and reproducible deployment [6]. Immutabil-
ity means that the container cannot be modified once it has been built and
deployed. As a result, the container configuration must be externalised to
dynamically update a list of whitelisted clients, access-control policies, and
secrets such as keys and credentials [67]. Moreover, with the dynamic mi-
croservice architecture that allows for rapid scaling-up and scaling-down of
microservices, enforcing the traditional perimeter security model 2 by stati-
cally configuring IP addresses is futile [53].
1This is not always the case. For example, the containers in a Kubernetes pod do share
network and storage resources.
2The perimeter model is explained in Chapter 5.
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3.6 Collecting Logs, Metrics, and
Distributed Traces
With a higher number of microservices comes complexity, which brings ad-
ditional challenges for collecting detailed observability data like metrics, dis-
tributed traces, and logs, which need to be analysed for malicious, suspicious
or anomalous patterns to detect and prevent security breaches and to acceler-
ate security incident investigations. A single request can propagate through
multiple microservices, which makes it harder to trace [67]. This becomes
even more challenging in applications that embrace the polyglot nature of the
microservice architecture. Companies that use the same core set of technolo-
gies across all microservices have the most success in integrating distributed
tracing [70]. A service mesh also greatly simplifies implementing tracing
functionality into a heterogeneous microservice application [70].
3.7 Bringing Diverse Security Expertise to
Secure Heterogeneous Microservices
As discussed previously in Chapter 2, the microservice architecture is hetero-
geneous in nature, and different microservices can use different technology
stacks. The shortcoming of a heterogeneous, polyglot architecture is that,
without a centralised security team, the responsibility for securing microser-
vices is distributed among many development teams, which requires expertise
in security from each team [15, 67]. To limit the responsibility of individual
development teams, a hybrid approach can be used, where a single centralised
security team collaborates with many development teams [67].
Chapter 2 introduced Open Policy Agent (OPA), which is an open-source
project started in 2016 as an effort to unify policy enforcement across a
variety of languages and frameworks.
Chapter 4
Edge Security with an API
Gateway
In the microservice architecture, edge security, also referred to as perimeter
security, often implies securing microservices at the API gateway level. In
fact, the API gateway pattern is the most common pattern for securing mi-
croservices in a production environment. An ingress API gateway represents
the only entry point to a microservice deployment, which handles north-south
traffic, also called public traffic, by intercepting all the requests from the pub-
lic internet before dispatching them to the microservices behind it. Thus, an
API gateway can act as a centralised PEP, which enforces authentication,
authorisation, and throttling policies and only allows legitimate requests to
reach the microservices behind it [66].
However, implementing authentication, authorisation, and throttling in
an API gateway by itself is not sufficient to protect the underlying services
from unwanted requests originating from outside the microservice deploy-
ment. To guarantee that the API gateway alone can access the underlying
services and prevent requests coming from outside the microservice deploy-
ment from bypassing the API gateway, there must be a firewall, mutual TLS,
or both between the API gateway and the underlying services.
Summarising the above, perimeter security comprises enforcing security
policies at the edge and restricting access to the underlying services. These
two aspects of securing microservices at the edge of a microservice deploy-
ment are discussed further in this chapter.
In addition to authentication, authorisation, and throttling, an API gate-
way would typically implement transport- or application-layer protocols, such
as TLS and HTTPS, and DoS/DDoS protection. However, these measures
are not specific to microservices and hence are not the focus of this chapter.
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4.1 Enforcing Access Control Policies at the
Edge of the Deployment
Authentication and authorisation are two closely related yet distinct security
mechanisms. Authentication is the process of verifying the identity of the
user, while authorisation is the process of verifying whether a specific user is
allowed to perform a particular action. This section discusses enforcing end-
user authentication and authorisation policies at the edge of the deployment.
Here, the term “end-user” does not refer exclusively to human users but also
includes other non-human actors that might be making calls to the API from
outside the microservice deployment.
As discussed earlier, a monolithic application typically has only a couple
of entry points. Only some but not all components of a monolithic applica-
tion accept requests directly; others are hidden from the outside world and
can only be accessed through language-level method or function calls. The
requests to a monolithic application are typically funnelled through authen-
tication and authorisation middleware. The middleware acts as a centralised
policy decision and enforcement point. It intercepts all the requests and ei-
ther passes them to the next function in the chain or rejects them. Modern
frameworks for building internet-connected applications such as ASP.NET
Core and Express.js provide authentication and authorisation middleware as
out-of-the-box functionality [3, 78].
From the perspective of the end-user, accessing microservices via an API
gateway is no different from accessing a monolithic application: the API
gateway hides the inherent complexity and rawness of a microservice de-
ployment from the consuming application and acts as a centralised PEP,
conceptually similarly to authentication and authorisation middleware in a
monolithic application.
Different consuming applications can authenticate themselves using dif-
ferent authentication schemes. The OpenAPI 3 Specification, an industry
standard for describing REST APIs, defines several security schemes which
the consuming application may use, including at least Basic authentication;
Bearer authentication; API key-based authentication in a header, query
string or cookie; OAuth 2.0; and OpenID Connect Discovery [55]. Han-
dling authentication in the API gateway has the advantage that it hides this
complexity from the microservices and relieves them of the responsibility of
handling a diverse set of authentication schemes [61]. With the backends for
frontends pattern, different API gateways can not only provide each consum-
ing application with a custom API but also handle the needed authentication
scheme.
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The focus of this section is on the message flow between the API gate-
way and the identity service or STS. To limit the scope of the discussion,
the assumption is made that the following three conditions are satisfied in
each discussed variation of the message flow. Firstly, the end-user obtains
an access token from the identity service and presents the token to the API
gateway in each request. Secondly, the API gateway verifies the token and
either allows or denies the request to the underlying microservice or microser-
vices. Thirdly, the connection between the end-user and the API gateway is
protected with SSL/TLS. Following are some variations of the message flow:
API gateway always invokes the identity service
To verify the user credentials, the API gateway calls the identity service
each time before passing the request to the underlying microservice or
microservices, as seen from Figure 4.1. The drawback with this approach
is that it increases the number of connections to the identity server, and
hence reduces the performance and availability of a microservice applica-
tion. The adverse effects of repeatedly invoking the identity service are
especially pronounced if the identity service does not scale on the same
level as the API gateway. This may be due to architectural limitations
caused by the sensitivity of this piece of infrastructure [67].
Figure 4.1: Invoking the identity service on each request
API gateway verifies a self-contained token
To mitigate the problem of performance and availability degradation, the
API gateway can verify the access token locally, provided that the access
token is self-contained and the API gateway can obtain a new certificate
of the identity service whenever it is renewed. This removes the necessity
of invoking the identity service every time the user presents an access
token. The drawback with this approach is that should a self-contained
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access token be prematurely revoked at the identity service end, the API
gateway would not be aware of this since it no longer interacts with the
identity service issuing these access tokens [67].
Figure 4.2: Verifying the signature of a self-contained token
API gateway verifies a self-contained token and subscribes to
updates in the revocation list
To mitigate the problem of premature access token revocation, the iden-
tity service must notify the API gateway of any events of access tokens
being prematurely revoked. The API gateway needs to subscribe to up-
dates in the access token revocation list via a Pub/Sub mechanism and
maintain a local copy of the revocation list, as seen from Figure 4.3.
A subscription can use either the pull or push mechanism. In addition
to subscribing for updates of the revocation list, the API gateway must
receive a new certificate of the identity service whenever it is renewed.
Figure 4.3: Subscribing to revocation list updates
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Table 4.1 summarises the above approaches to authentication at the edge














Revocation Yes, no additional
mechanisms are
required
No Yes, requires a
Pub/Sub service
Table 4.1: Comparison of approaches to end-user authentication
As seen from the table, the first approach achieves the best security, the
second approach wrings the most performance, while the last approach aims
to establish a balance between the two. However, it also requires that the
additional mechanisms for maintaining an up-to-date revocation list at the
API gateway are implemented, which increases the complexity and required
development effort.
After the request is authenticated as coming from a specific end-user,
the API gateway might want to verify that the end-user is authorised to
perform the requested action. Based on the types of AC models presented in
Chapter 2, authorisation policy enforcement at the edge can be implemented
as follows:
API gateway enforces coarse-grained RBAC policies and more
fine-grained AC policies are enforced at the service level
Typically, an ingress API gateway implements coarse-grained RBAC to
microservice API paths and methods, while more fine-grained AC to
individual domain objects is enforced at the service level; implementing
fine-grained AC in the API gateway is complicated since microservices
encapsulate their domain logic [61, 67]. To enforce RBAC policies, the
API gateway requires information about the identity and roles of the
end-user making the request and applicable policies. The API gateway
does not store users; instead, it depends on a standalone identity service
or similar and simply enforces the policies [13]. The roles assigned to
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the end-user can be either included in the request in a cryptographically
secure manner, for example, in a JWT, or retrieved from the identity
service upon receiving the request. In the former case, the API gateway
will not know if the roles have been changed. To mitigate this issue, the
identity service can revoke the token issued for this user and notify the
API gateway as shown previously in Figure 4.3. In the latter case, the
API gateway can cache users and roles to reduce the response time and
the number of connections to the identity service.
Implementing RBAC at the edge of the deployment has several lim-
itations. Firstly, it only provides coarse-grained AC, which requires mi-
croservices to implement their own authorisation logic. While RBAC
policies are considered to be easy to audit by reviewing the roles assigned
to the user and enumerating permissions within this set of roles [12, 39],
defining and enforcing authorisation policies in different locations risks
losing this advantage of RBAC. In addition, if parts of the authorisation
logic are defined in source code, changing this logic requires redeploying
the microservice. Secondly, having the same set of roles might not sat-
isfy the needs of all microservices, which also creates coupling between
microservices and the API gateway or identity service because microser-
vices are dependent on centrally created and assigned roles. Thirdly,
enforcing RBAC policies at the edge allows the requests that would be
later denied by the underlying microservices to enter the private network.
Finally, not all access control policies can be expressed through simple
role assignments. For example, a student may be denied access to grades
other than their own. This kind of rules must be implemented as a part
of microservice domain logic.
API gateway enforces fine-grained ABAC policies, which can be
defined at different places
To delegate more complex decision making to an ingress API gateway or
proxy, the owner of the microservice must define the policies in a declar-
ative format that would allow the API gateway reach an authorisation
decision by evaluating the request and against the policies and data. Pol-
icy engines such as OPA and Speedle+ acting as a PDP provide means
to evaluate both RBAC and ABAC policies described in a declarative
way. ABAC policies offer more flexibility and granularity compared to
RBAC policies [12]. This allows microservices to externalise their access
control logic.
Based on the case studies in Section 5.2, the general approach to
policy distribution is to store them in a centralised location such as an
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S3 bucket and notify the PDP such as an API gateway, microservice, or
sidecar about policy changes. Policies can be defined per microservice,
per deployment, or combine both in a layered approach.
The API gateway can either handle decision making by itself or rely
on an independently deployed policy service. Both OPA and Speedle+
policy engines can be embedded inside the API gateway as a library, run
as a host-level daemon, or be deployed in a separate Docker container.
API gateway enforces fine-grained CBAC policies based on an
unforgeable token
Both RBAC and ABAC policies are identity-based meaning that the
PEP requires proof of the user identity before it can allow the request.
Besides, the PDP requires the policies to reach an authorisation decision.
As opposed to this, an ingress API gateway or proxy can enforce fine-
grained CBAC policies based on an unforgeable capability token, such as
a macaroon [7]. A capability token already contains all the information
needed to make the authorisation decision, and hence no other parties
need to be involved in decision making. However, there is no evidence
of widespread use of CBAC in web API security and, as discussed in
Chapter 2, a traditional authentication mechanism may still be required
for user accountability and audit.
Although other approaches and variations do exist, the list above is reason-
ably inclusive. Regardless of the chosen AC model, implementing autho-
risation in the API gateway has limitations. Firstly, it inherits the shared
issues of having an APA gateway, which may become a single point of failure.
Secondly, an ingress API gateway only controls public traffic that enters the
microservices deployment, also called north-south traffic, but not the inter-
actions between microservices. Consequently, it does not control private, or
east-west, traffic that flows between microservices. If one microservice calls
another microservice, the called microservice must handle the authorisation
by itself, at the edge of the service. This is discussed in Chapter 5.
4.2 Restricting Access to the Underlying
Microservices
Enforcing authentication, authorisation and throttling policies alone in the
API gateway does not protect the underlying microservices against requests
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coming from outside the microservice deployment. This implies that there
must be mechanisms in place to prevent requests originating from outside
the microservice deployment from bypassing the API gateway. This section
discusses two such mechanisms, firewall rules and mTLS, which can be used
individually or in combination.
Restricting access with a firewall
A firewall allows or blocks incoming and outgoing network traffic based
on a set of inbound and outbound rules to restrict access and prevent
data exfiltration. It can be configured only to allow the API gateway
to access the underlying microservices and to reject or drop all traffic
that is not expressly permitted by the rules. In an L3/L4 firewall, also
referred to as a stateful firewall, the action is taken solely based on source
or destination IP address, port, and protocol. A L7 firewall, also referred
to as a context-aware firewall, can also inspect the content of the packets
in addition to everything that the L3/L4 firewall do [35].
Restricting access using mTLS
The standard TLS protocol provides both the integrity and confidential-
ity of the transmitted data, allowing the client to authenticate the server
by verifying the presented X.509 certificate signed by a trusted CA and
to negotiate an encryption algorithm and cryptographic keys [14]. Mu-
tual TLS (mTLS) refers to the process whereby both parties present their
X.509 certificate and prove possession of the corresponding private key.
mTLS is a more agile alternative to a firewall. In addition to restricting
access, it achieves confidentiality and integrity of the data in transit be-
tween the API gateway and a microservice. mTLS verification happens
at the L4. As a result, it does not require changes to the application
logic of the microservice, which aligns with the single responsibility prin-
ciple. As an alternative to implementing mTLS in the microservice itself,
it can instead be handled by its sidecar proxy and ultimately a service
mesh. Restricting the access only to requests coming directly from the
API gateway is a special case of service-to-service authentication, which
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
Table 4.2 summarises the differences between restricting access with a firewall
and mTLS.
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Firewalls mTLS
Layer L3/L4 or L7 L4, does not propagate up
to the L7
Protocols Typically TCP and UDP Supports also messaging
protocols and can be used
with RabbitMQ, Kafka,
and other message brokers
to restrict access to reactive
microservices
PEP A firewall An API gateway, microser-
vice or sidecar proxy
Scalability Better suited for a static
infrastructure, needs to be
updated if the IP address of
an API Gateway changes
Suited for both static and
dynamic environments
Granularity Better suited for coarse-
grained network segmenta-
tion
Suited for fine-grained ac-
cess control
Encryption No Yes
Table 4.2: Comparison of firewall rules and mTLS
Chapter 5
Zero Trust Security with a
Service Mesh
The traditional perimeter security model breaks the network into zones, each
of which is assigned a level of trust. For example, in the edge security ar-
chitecture similar to the ones presented in Chapter 4, the client exists in the
untrusted zone, the API gateway that faces the public internet is placed in
the demilitarised zone (DMZ), and the underlying microservices are in the
trusted zone, as visualised in Figure 5.1. The perimeter model relies solely
on network security, that is, on placing firewalls between zones with different
levels of trust, and lacks intra-zone traffic inspection [23].
Figure 5.1: Traditional network security architecture
It assumes that each microservice deployed in the private network and
the private network itself can be fully trusted, including everything that a
microservice claims about itself and the end-user [67]. However, this as-
sumption is flawed and fails to address security threats to a microservice
application deployed in a dynamic environment.
A typical attack on a microservice deployment that leverages the perime-
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ter model involves a microservice in the “trusted” network consuming a com-
promised external resource outside the firewall. It allows data to be both
infiltrated and exfiltrated from the otherwise-protected network. As this ex-
ample shows, whilst protecting a microservice deployment at the edge has its
benefits, including providing a stronger defence-in-depth by adding an extra
line of defence, it is not sufficient [23].
As a result, the perimeter security model is becoming obsolete, and the
industry is shifting towards the zero trust security model. In a 2019 Forbes
Insights survey1, 66 percent of more than a thousand security executives and
practitioners and 90 percent of companies where security is highly integrated
into decision making reported having zero trust networking policies in place
[85]. Almost 50 percent of respondents reported a desire to focus their efforts
on securing their private networks [75].
As opposed to the perimeter model, the zero trust model assumes that the
network is always hostile. Gilman and Barth list five fundamental assertions
about a zero trust network [23]:
• The network is never assumed to be trusted.
• The network must be secured both against external and against internal
threats, which always exist on the network.
• Neither physical nor logical host placement alone can be used to treat
the network as trusted.
• Every actor such as a user or microservice and their every action must
be authenticated and authorised.
• Security policies must be calculated dynamically.
In the context of the microservice architecture, this means that each
request must be authenticated at every entry point [67], service-to-service
interactions must be closely monitored to confine the trust put on individual
microservices and to limit the potential damage [72], and firewalls may be
used to restrict the potential damage caused by a compromised microservice
within the internal network in addition to protecting the internal network
from external threats as in the perimeter security model [82].
This chapter discusses steps for incorporating zero trust security into a
microservice deployment by securing east-west traffic with a service mesh.
These steps include protecting service-to-service communication channels
with mutual TLS and JWTs, securely sharing end-user context between
1The survey has been conducted as part of the paid program with VMware.
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microservices, managing secrets across microservices, as well as additional
security measures such as distributed tracing.
5.1 Enforcing Access Control Policies on
End-Users at the Edge of the Service
Whereas all the components of a monolithic application share the same web
session and the identity of the end-user is retrieved from it, microservices
generally do not share resources. In a zero trust microservice application,
two conditions must be met. Firstly, a microservice must be able to commu-
nicate the identity of the end-user to the services that it invokes. Secondly,
a microservices must not trust whatever another microservice claims about
the end-user who initiates the message flow between the two microservices.
These conditions imply that the end-user must be continuously authenticated
at every entry point. To allow authentication, the identity of the end-user
can be securely passed from one microservice to another in a self-contained
access token such as JWT that carries information about the end-user [61,
67]:
Reusing the same JWT across microservices
It the first approach, a microservice reuses the JWT it received from the
upstream microservice and passes it to the downstream microservice, as
shown in Figure 5.2. Since the audience of the JWT token remains the
same, all or at least the majority of the microservices in the deployment
must accept the same audience value.
Requesting a new JWT for each service interaction
In the second approach, a microservice requests a new JWT from the STS
in exchange for the JWT it receives from the upstream microservice, as
shown in Figure 5.3. The STS is either the identity service or a service
that trusts the identity service which issued the original access token.
The STS issues a new JWT in exchange for the old JWT under a new
audience and signs it. It can also populate the “jti” claim with a unique
identifier for the JWT to prevent the JWT from being replayed [33]. The
token exchange approach allows the STS to deny the request if the calling
service must be denied access to the called service based on the autho-
risation policies. However, service-to-service authorisation is typically
implemented at the service level, as discussed in Section 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Reusing the access token with the same audience value to au-
thenticate the user at each entry point
Figure 5.3: Requesting a new access token with a new audience value for
each service interaction to authenticate the user at each entry point
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A microservice can either implement end-user authorisation by itself like
a monolithic application or offload it to a sidecar to adhere to the single
responsibility principle. Delegating authorisation to a sidecar inherits the
benefits and drawbacks of the sidecar pattern discussed in Chapter 2. Since
a microservice and its sidecar run in the same pod, neither a firewall nor
mTLS between the two is required.
Suppose all of the services in a heterogeneous microservice application
reuse the same sidecar implementation. All the sidecars can form the data
plane of a service mesh. As a best practice for operating containers, the
container image has to be immutable. As a result, authorisation policies must
be dynamically updated in memory via the push or pull model. The control
plane of the service mesh can provision up-to-date authorisation policies to
the sidecars. For example, the Istio service mesh extracts the identity of the
end-user from a JWT and allows specifying authorisation policies based on
that. The authorisation policies are stored in the config store and distributed
by Istiod to each sidecar, along with the keys where appropriate [30].
The authorisation sidecar can act as the PDP or both as the PDP and
PEP. In the former case, microservices can also share a library or package
to simplify and unify interaction with the authorisation sidecar [37]. In the
latter case, the authorisation sidecar must be a sidecar proxy and accept all
the incoming requests before they can reach the microservice.
Envoy sidecar proxy is commonly used for end-user authentication as
it supports JWT end-user authentication out of the box [16], while policy
engines such as OPA deployed as a sidecar can handle authorisation policy
decision making [54].
The benefits and drawbacks of implementing different access control mod-
els such as RBAC, ABAC, and CBAC in a sidecar are much the same as when
these are implemented in an ingress API gateway or proxy, as discussed in
Chapters 2 and 4.
5.2 Enforcing Access Control Policies on
Peer Services at the Edge of the Service
In a typical microservice deployment, microservices interact with one an-
other using IPC mechanisms such as HTTP-based REST, WebSockets, and
gRPC, message-based AMQP and STOMP, or binary TCP and UDP. Re-
gardless of the IPC mechanism, inter-service communication channels must
be protected against eavesdropping and tampering. Microservices must have
a way to authenticate one another to comply with zero trust networking
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principles [67, 82]. East-west traffic can be secured, inter alia, by using a
secure channel (e.g., mTLS with X.509 certificates) or public-key encryption
and signature (e.g., JSON Web Signature (JWS) and JSON Web Encryption
(JWE)):
Service-to-service authentication with mTLS
mTLS enables microservices to mutually authenticate one another and
protects the integrity and confidentiality of the data in transit. However,
it does not provide non-repudiation.
To enable mTLS, each microservice must hold a valid X.509 certificate
signed by a certificate authority (CA), trusted by all the microservices.
If none of the microservice entry points is exposed outside the internal
network, but they are instead hidden behind a reverse proxy, a private CA
is sufficient. A cloud provider may offer services for creating a private CA.
For example, Amazon offers AWS Certificate Manager (ACM) Private
Certificate Authority (CA). Alternatively, OpenSSL can be used to set
up a private CA.
mTLS is a standard method for implementing service-to-service au-
thentication. Many service mesh implementations such as Istio, Kuma,
Aspen Mesh and Linkerd provide mTLS as an out-of-the-box function-
ality [30, 40, 43]. Istio automatically configures service sidecars to use
mTLS when calling other services [30]. However, while suitable for syn-
chronous communication, mTLS cannot be used to protect asynchronous
communication and storage of protected messages.
Service-to-service authentication with JWS
JWS represents content secured with digital signatures or MACs using
JSON-based data structures. A JWS object consists of three concate-
nated Base64-encoded segments separated by periods: the JOSE header,
JWS payload and JWS signature [32].
Digital signatures have two advantages over mTLS. Firstly, they fa-
cilitate non-repudiation. Secondly, they enable asynchronous communi-
cation and storage of protected messages.
To protect the confidentiality of the data in transit and at rest, the
content of the messages must also be encrypted. JWE represents en-
crypted content using JSON-based data structures. In the JWE compact
serialisation, a JWE object consists of five concatenated Base64-encoded
segments separated by periods: the JWE protected header, JWE en-
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crypted key, JWE initialisation vector, JWE ciphertext and JWE au-
thenticated tag [34].
While JWS and JWE can be nested in any order, digitally signing
a message and then encrypting the signed message should be preferred
since this prevents the signature from being stripped from the message
and provides privacy for the signer [33].
Table 5.1 summarises how secure channels and public-key cryptography com-
pare to each other. Regardless of whether east-west traffic is secured using
mTLS or JWS and JWE, X.509 certificates and private-public key pairs must
be stored and distributed across a dynamic environment.










Table 5.1: Comparing establishing trust with mTLS and JWS
After the two microservices mutually authenticated one another, the
called service should verify that the calling service is allowed to perform
the requested action.
While ACLs are not well suited for defining and enforcing AC policies in
a microservice application with many end-users, they are fit for defining and
enforcing AC policies on peer microservices:
• Each microservice is typically owned by a team that also manages the
permissions to access the microservice. With the microservice being
a resource and the team being a resource owner, this corresponds to
discretionary access control (DAC). By defining an ACL for their mi-
croservice, the team can maintain complete control over which other
services can access the microservice and forbid delegation of these ac-
cess rights.
• The number of services in a microservice deployment is typically small
in relation to the number of end-users.
CHAPTER 5. ZERO TRUST SECURITY WITH A SERVICE MESH 42
Based on the reviewed approaches to addressing peer authorisation em-
ployed by businesses that build their services on top of the microservice archi-
tecture, service-to-service authorisation solutions are primarily ACL-based:
Monzo
Monzo is an online bank based in the United Kingdom. They adopted
the microservice architecture from the start in February 2015 and had
over 1,500 microservices with more than 9,300 unique connection as of the
end of 2019. As a bank, they work towards a completely zero trust plat-
form [36]. Each service has a manually approved list of allowed services,
which has, on average, six items. The policies are enforced using the Ku-
bernetes NetworkPolicy API. However, due to a large number of services
and connections, maintaining the lists without automatisation would be
impracticable. As a result, Monzo wrote a tool called rpcmap, which is
triggered whenever new code is pushed to GitHub. rpcmap scans code for
requests to other services and generates a rule file per called service. The
name of the file service.calling/egress/service.called.rule rep-
resents both the calling service and the called service. GitHub then asks a
team building the called service to review the rule file */service.called.
rule and allow the calling service as ingress source by adding its label
to a NetworkPolicy object. With this approach, Monzo aimed at min-
imising the number of manual steps that are prone to errors and human
factors.
LinkedIn
LinkedIn is a social network geared to businesses and professionals which
run more than 700 microservices as of 2019. Each service defines a list
of services and permissions. The authorisation check is performed by an
authorisation client module that runs on each service. To reduce latency,
the service keeps a copy of the ACL in-memory and makes an authorisa-
tion decision locally. The original ACL is stored in an Espresso database
fronted by an external Couchbase cache. A change data capture system
based on Brooklin notifies the service if the original ACL is changed.
ACLs are managed through a cloud management interface Nuage or a
command-line tool. However, LinkedIn does not reveal the process of
defining the ACLs [42].
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Dropbox
Dropbox is a cloud storage service which runs hundreds of Courier ser-
vices. Courier is a gRPC framework for service development created by
Dropbox. Each service holds a TLS certificate issued by a private CA.
Services mutually authenticate each other with TLS 1.2+. After the
identity of the calling service is confirmed and the request is decrypted,
the called service verifies that the calling service has proper permissions.
ACLs can be set on both services and individual methods. Courier han-
dles subscribing for policy updates and fetching new versions as they
become available, relieving the development team from this responsibil-
ity [52].
Other microservice-driven businesses approach service-to-service authorisa-
tion by enforcing ABAC policies:
Atlassian
Atlassian develops cloud products for software development and project
management, which include JIRA, Trello, Bitbucket, and Confluence.
These products rely on thousands of heterogeneous microservices with
tens of thousands instances that run in AWS, their in-house Kubernetes
cluster, and other locations.
Atlassian implements the perimeter security model by partitioning
the network into the customer, DMZ, and internal zones. Each zone
entry point is protected by an API gateway that enforces security poli-
cies on inter-zone traffic. Both API gateways and services utilise an
internal HTTP request authentication tool called SLAuth, which stands
for Service-Level Authentication. In addition to authentication, SLAuth
implements authorisation. To support authorisation, it embeds OPA.
SLAuth has several deployment models and can be embedded in an ap-
plication or Envoy sidecar proxy.
Policies are written in a JSON-based format and translated into Rego.
Before policies reach SLAuth, they are submitted to a policy register,
which validates, tags, and stores them in an S3 bucket. The policies
are searched via environment, region, and service tags and served via a
content delivery network (CDN).
Atlassian distinguishes between platform and service policies. Plat-
form policies are enforced across the entire platform or a segment of a
platform to provide a basic level of security to all services, while service
policies are written by service owners and only apply a single service.
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This model is used to authorise peer services and CI/CD systems. The
process of defining policies is mostly manual [71].
Pinterest
Pinterest is a visual discovery engine which runs thousands of instances
of hundreds of microservices.
With some exceptions, each microservice is deployed alongside an
Envoy sidecar proxy and another sidecar that wraps around the OPA
engine. Envoy authenticates peer services and CI/CD systems by using
mTLS. X.509 service and system certificates include information about
the identity of their owner. When Envoy receives an API request destined
for the microservice, it passes the identity of the calling service or system
to the OPA sidecar that decides if the request should be allowed or denied.
In addition to decision making, the OPA sidecar registers with ZooKeeper
to receive notifications about policy changes and fetches policies from an
S3 bucket if needed.
To enforce an OPA policy, the developer must submit a corresponding
Rego file in a pull request. The pull request must be reviewed and ap-
proved by another member of the development team or a member of the
security team. The approved pull request triggers a build on an isolated
build system, which uploads the policy to the S3 bucket and triggers
ZooKeeper.
This model of policy distribution and decision making also applies to
end-user authorisation [37].
The way of enforcing AC is usually uniform across the whole microservices
application. The mentioned ways include relying on Kubernetes Policies,
using custom libraries developed by a dedicated security team and using a
service mesh of sidecars.
Most of the reviewed company tech blogs or white papers have no mention
of how they compile the ACL and what are the human processes behind




This chapter describes the process of migrating from a monolithic to a secure
microservice architecture. The existing monolithic application is an online
learning platform used in CS-C3130 Information Security course organised
by the Aalto University School of Science. For simplicity, it is referred to as
the application throughout this and the following chapters.
According to the survey of 21 microservice adopters, practitioners adopt
microservices to encourage team autonomy and ownership, reduce time to
market, scale up and down cost-effectively, increase fault tolerance and catas-
trophe preparedness, improve maintainability, enable DevOps, experiment
with new technologies and adhere to the mainstream [74]. The reasons for
migrating the monolithic online learning platform to a small set of microser-
vices include solving the existing maintainability issues, improving the readi-
ness of the application for DevOps, and experimenting with new technologies
and ways of building secure microservice applications.
This chapter examines the architecture and functionality of the original
monolithic application, lists the requirements that need to be taken into
consideration during the migration process, describes the migration process,
and evaluates the resulting microservice architecture.
6.1 The Starting Point for the Migration
The application is a monolithic Model-View-Controller (MVC) application
written in Python using the Flask framework. Its primary purpose is to
provide students with a user interface for launching the exercises and sub-
mitting a solution for each part of the exercise. Hence, it is referred to as the
launcher. The launcher also provides visualised statistics on the progress of
the students in the class.
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Figure 6.1: The architecture of the monolithic application
The launcher is deployed in the Apache web server and secured with
HTTPS with a certificate from Let’s Encrypt, which is a free, automated,
and open CA. It uses a MySQL database to store user data. Both the
launcher and the database are assigned static IP addresses in a private IP
address space. The database allows connections only from the IP address of
the launcher.
The database has two tables, users and marks. The users table contains
the following fields: id, first_name, last_name, email, student_number,
user_number, password, and salt. The marks table contains the following
fields: id, user_id, exercise_id, problem_id, points, and state. The
user_id field in the marks table is a foreign key that points to the primary
key of the users table. Flask handles access to the data and database mi-
grations via object-relational mapping (ORM).
Accounts
The launcher is not integrated with Aalto Shibboleth single sign-on (SSO)
system for online services. As a result, the student needs to go through a
separate process of authentication and authorisation. The student creates an
account by submitting a form with their full name, email address, student
number, and password.
The launcher does not currently validate or use the provided email, nor
can it be used for a password reset. A password reset can only be performed
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by a member of the course staff.
The launcher does not impose restrictions on the password. The password
is hashed, and the hash and salt are stored in the database. A secret used
for hashing the password is stored in a Git repository alongside the source
code.
The launcher generates a random user number, which is used in the rest
of the system in place of the other personal identifiers for better GDPR
compliance.
The student authenticates with their email and password. The informa-
tion specific to the student is stored from one request to the next in a session,
which is implemented on top of cryptographically signed cookies. The secret
key used for signing is also stored in the Git repository. These tasks are
handled by flask login.
Exercises
The configuration settings for the exercises and problems are defined in a
JSON configuration file, which must be edited to open or close an exercise
or a problem within an exercise. The launcher starts exercises within their
own Docker containers upon student request. It manages containers using a
Python library for the Docker Engine API. The launcher specifies a name for
each container, which is used when referencing the container within a Docker
network.
The random user number is provided to the container as an environment
variable and used to personalise the excesses. Access to a running Docker
container is not restricted to the student who launched the exercise. However,
the applications running in the Docker containers are typically password and
do not contain personal information.
The launcher evaluates the problems automatically and stores the grades
in the database. The database schema can also be seen in Figure 6.1.
Statistics
A scheduled job produces the statistics and saves them to a text file that can
be accessed by the launcher and an authorised member of the course staff.
The launcher anonymises and visualises the data, while an authorised person
can access the produced text file that also contains identifying information
of the students.
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6.2 Considerations Before the Migration
The requirements that need to be taken into consideration can be classified
into the following categories: trust and security, performance and costs, de-
ployability, and maintainability. These categories are elaborated upon in this
section.
Trust and Security
A few assets were identified that might be of interest and must be protected:
• Confidentiality and integrity of personal data. The application stores
personal data of students. There is the identifying information (first
name, last name, email, and student number) and the exercise results
and log files. This personal data must be protected following the rules
of the GDPR.
• Integrity of the grades for the exercises. The application evaluates the
exercises and stores the grades in the database. These grades must be
protected from tampering.
• Prevention of accidental loss, destruction, or damage of identifying in-
formation and the grades for the exercises. The final grade for the
course depends on the results of the online exercises. Therefore, they
must not be lost, destructed, or damaged.
• Confidentiality of the solutions to the exercises. The solutions must
not be known to students before solving the problem.
• Confidentiality of the source code of the exercises. The exercises must
remain a black box for students.
• Availability. The application should be available at all times, especially
close to the exercise submission deadline.
Performance and Cost
As evident from the previous chapters, the challenges of securing microser-
vices do not solely concern the security aspects of a microservice application
but also other aspects such as performance and cost. The best security cannot
be achieved with the most performance for the least cost. For that reason, a
prioritisation of the goals may be needed while planning a migration [50]. In
the discussed case, performance is not critical since the application is neither
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a latency-critical application nor a commercial product. Before the exercises
were containerised, there was an issue of high memory usage; however, this
issue no longer exists.
Deployability
The deployment process is not automated and involves manual steps, de-
scribed in the README file. As a result, it is time-consuming and error-prone.
Due to the deployment complexity of the microservice architecture, DevOps
is a prerequisite to adopting the microservice architecture.
Maintainability
The application is typically maintained by a small number of course assistants
that rotate frequently.
Taibi et al. [74] Richardson [61] Newman [50] Palladino [56]
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Table 6.1: Strategies for refactoring a monolith to microservices
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6.3 Migration Process
Table 6.1 summarises the four strategies for migrating from a monolith to
microservices found in the literature. Out of the four strategies, the grad-
ual refinement and the Big Bang rewrite strategies are the ones that can
be adopted in the current work. However, the Big Bang rewrite strategy is
rarely adopted and generally not recommended since it is likely to stall the
development of the features and slow down the response time to new market
conditions and user needs, and therefore lacks one of the main advantages
of the microservice architecture, which is agility and faster time-to-market.
Taking this into account, this work adheres to the gradual refinement strat-
egy. Both Richardson [61] and Newman [50] refer to this application mod-
ernisation strategy as the strangler fig application pattern, a term introduced
by Fowler [20]. This section describes the process of decoupling a service from
the monolith as the first stage of the migration. The process roughly follows
the steps identified by Newman [50].
6.3.1 Decoupling a Service from the Monolith
A migration should typically start by decoupling edge capabilities, as op-
posed to capabilities that are deeply embedded in the monolithic application
[21, 50]. This makes the identity service a good candidate for the first mi-
croservice.
Priority Requirements
1 • It must provide functionality for creating an account that has
at least the first name, last name, email address, and student
number of a student.
• It must generate a random user number for each student.
• It must issue an access token in exchange for a valid email
and password.
• The private key used for signing access tokens must be kept
secret.
2 • It should issue short-lived access tokens.
• It should provide a token revocation endpoint.
3 • It should log all the requests.
• It should provide the API reference documentation.
• It should expose a JWKS endpoint.
Table 6.2: Requirements for the new identity microservice
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Specifying the requirements for the new microservice
Refactoring a monolith to microservices should be a behaviour-preserving
change [49]. This also affects the requirements for the new microservice.
Table 6.2 lists the requirements in the order of priority, where 1 denotes the
highest priority and larger integers denote lower priorities. Table 6.3 lists the
API methods of the future microservice that met the requirements.
Method Description
POST /users Creates a user.
POST /tokens Validates the provided credentials
and issues a short-lived JWT ac-
cess token.
GET /tokens/validity Validates the JWT access token.
POST /tokens/revoke Revokes the JWT access token.
GET /.well-known/jwks.json Exposes a JWKS endpoint.
Table 6.3: Identity service API methods
Embracing the polyglot nature of the microservice architecture
The code of the future microservice can be either extracted from the mono-
lith or rewritten [50]. The amount of code implementing the domain logic
for generating user numbers, hashing passwords and validating credentials is
small, especially when compared to the amount of boilerplate code that han-
dles starting a server, connecting to a database, request routing, and error
handling. As a result, we decided to rewrite and retire the old code. This also
allowed us to embrace the polyglot nature of the microservice architecture
and use TypeScript with Node.js and Express.
TypeScript is a gradually-typed superset of JavaScript that adds static
type-checking via type annotations. Enforcing the use of type annotations
by configuring typescript-eslint to disallow usage of the any type eases
bug detection. Based on the results of the empirical study by Gao et al.,
TypeScript could have prevented 15 percent of the bugs in large, mature
projects publically available on GitHub [22].
While the old code contained mutable variables and threw exceptions,
the new code is immutable and handles errors in a functional fashion.
The new identity microservice uses TypeORM to access the database
which supports the original MySQL database. The benefits of using an ORM
include the lack of direct manipulation with SQL, which protects from SQL
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injections. The identity microservice also relies on Redis to store the access
token revocation list.
The identity microservice, Redis and MySQL database are deployed as
Docker containers. The Docker environment is described and built with
Docker Compose using the Infrastructure as Code (IaC) approach. In ad-
dition to service definitions, the Compose file contains network and volume
definitions. The network is configured with static IP addresses. Each con-
tainer is reachable by other containers on that network.
Testing the newly formed microservice in isolation
Before the identity service is integrated into the application, it is tested in
isolation with Jest.
6.3.2 Putting the Pieces Together
After the new identity service is tested in isolation, it can be integrated into
the launcher:
Configuring the old services with Docker Compose
Firstly, a Dockerfile is created for both the launcher and the scheduled
job that produces statistics. The definitions for these services are added
to the Compose file.
Integrating the newly formed microservice into the monolith
Secondly, existing calls to the methods of class User are redirected to the
new service. This step also required additional changes in the codebase
which were not directly related to redirecting the calls but rather to the
transition from session-based to token-based authentication. While the
new identity service provides endpoints for token validation and revoca-
tion, the launcher ignores these and instead verifies the validity of the
token locally. When the user logs in with their email and password, the
launcher requests a new JWT from the identity service in exchange for
these credentials and saves the token in a cookie.
Removing the not needed parts from the monolith
Thirdly, the no longer needed code is deleted from the launcher codebase.
This includes, for example, the whole User model.
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Setting up HTTPS
Finally, the definition for a NGINX reverse proxy is added to the Com-
pose file. NGINX is configured to use a Let’s Encrypt certificate and
expose the port 443 for inbound HTTPS traffic. It passes the client
request to the launcher, fetches the response, and sends it back to the
client.
6.3.3 Decomposing the Database
Loose coupling and high cohesion are one of the key characteristic features
of microservices. To satisfy these constraints imposed by the microservice
architecture, each microservice has to keep the data private in a separate
database [49, 61]. At the same time, Taibi et al. identify database migration
and data splitting as the second most reported migration issue [74].
While data migration on a live application poses a challenge, this is not
a concern in the present case since the application is publicly available only
during the periods when the course is running.
With only the identity service extracted from the monolith, the resulting
architecture would have to follow the shared database pattern because of
the statistics job which uses data from both the users and marks database
tables. However, sharing a single database among two or more services causes
a couple of issues. Firstly, with a shared database, there is no clear separation
as to which service owns the database schema or understanding about what
parts of the schema can be changed safely, causing no effect on the functioning
of other services. Secondly, allowing all services access to any data violates
the principle of least privilege. The launcher would have unnecessary access
to sensitive user data, which includes student numbers and password hashes
and salts.
The chosen approach to mitigate the above issues was to split the database
to have one database per service and to transform the statistics job into
its own microservice. The statistics microservice is allowed read access to
both databases. This does not fully resolve the issue of coordinating the
changes between the microservices; however, it does restrict the launcher
from accessing sensitive user data stored in the database.
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6.4 Evaluating the Näıve Microservice
Architecture
The steps described in the previous section result in the final strangler fig
architecture, as shown in Figure 6.2.
Figure 6.2: The näıve architecture of the microservice application
The resulting architecture is referred to as “näıve” since it was imple-
mented prior to reviewing the literature summarised in Chapters 4 and 5.
Below are the achievements and shortcomings of the migration evaluated
based on the knowledge summarised in the previous chapters of the thesis:
Deployment automation
The adoption of the IoC approach with Docker Compose has simplified
the deployment process by reducing the manual overhead of installing
dependencies and configuring service dependencies. However, the static
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IP address assignment makes the configuration relatively static, which
reduces the agility of microservices. Dynamic IP address assignment, on
the other hand, would allow microservices to start and terminate quickly
to scale up and down. However, it would also present a new challenge of
service discovery.
Separation of concerns
The User domain model that is responsible for implementing any busi-
ness rules related to users is decoupled from the rest of the application
logic, which also helps to isolate the more security-critical parts of the
application. Nevertheless, the launcher remains partially responsible for
authentication and authorisation concerns. It verifies the JWT upon ev-
ery request to a protected API endpoint and retrieves the identity of the
user from the JWT (Appendix A). The launcher also verifies if the user
is permitted to access the requested resource or perform the requested
action. For example, it asserts that the problem is open before evaluating
the solution to the problem. Instead of implementing these checks in the
launcher code, authorisation decision making could have been delegated
to a dedicated sidecar. Assuming that the routes are changed to con-
tain also the unique identifier of the user uid and the token is passed in
a more conventional manner in the Authorisation header, the same
authorisation logic can be expressed in Rego.
Secrets management
The secrets are provided as environment variables. They are no longer
stored in the Git repository, nor they are embedded in the Docker image.
As a result, if a secret has to be added or revoked, the image does not need
to be rebuilt. This aligns with the best practice of keeping containers
immutable, as discussed in Section 3.5.
Database per service
With two separate databases, the launcher no longer has access to sensi-
tive user data at rest, which aligns with the principle of least privilege.
However, the statistic microservice still has access to information such as
password hashes and salts that it does not need.
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Trust between microservices
Overall, the implemented architecture corresponds to the perimeter se-
curity model. Only the NGINX proxy is exposed outside the Docker
Compose deployment, while all other services communicate within the
private network and only the launcher is semi-exposed to the public in-
ternet via the NGINX proxy. Within the private network, the services
trust one another and the network which contradicts the zero trust net-
working principles. The east-west traffic is not protected.
Other concerns
The resulting architecture does not fully address the existing issues such
as lack of integration with Aalto SSO and lack of access control to exercise
containers. The issue of lack of password reset is addressed partially.
Password reset can now be performed by requesting a reset link from
the course staff. If deployed on a cloud platform that allows outbound
SMTP, the same reset link could be emailed to the student.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
The microservice architecture is a still-young architectural style, which is
rapidly gaining widespread adoption. In the 2020 O’Reilly survey on mi-
croservices adoption, three-quarters of 1502 respondents reported their or-
ganisations adopting microservices, a majority of which started using mi-
croservices in the past three years. At the same time, only slightly more
than 10 percent of organisations adopted microservices more than five years
ago [44]. The microservice architecture is driven by the industry, which re-
sults in a lack of academic research and a wealth of grey literature such
as company blogs, white papers, and conference talks. Grey literature pro-
vides a valuable resource for understanding the microservices architecture
and gaining insight into current practices. This thesis references a number
of such resources, such as Monzo, LinkedIn, and Dropbox engineering blogs
and conference talks given by engineers from Atlassian and Pinterest.
Besides being a buzzword, the microservice architecture tackles real prob-
lems of the monolithic architecture, which are discussed in Section 2.1. How-
ever, the adoption of the microservice architecture also affects how security
must be approached. Chapter 3 lists the novel architectural and organisa-
tional challenges of microservices, which include protecting a larger attack
surface; striking a balance between security and performance; establishing
trust between microservices; sharing user context; managing policies and se-
crets; collecting logs, metrics, and distributed traces; and bringing diverse
security expertise to secure heterogeneous microservices.
Both the edge of the microservice application and the communication be-
tween microservices within the application need to be secured: while securing
the application at the edge reduces the attack surface, this should not lead
us to downplay the importance of securing each microservice at the service
level. This need is consistent with the tendency towards adopting the zero
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trust security model, which is evident in industry [75, 85]. Protecting the
microservice deployment at the edge of the deployment and at the edge of
the service are discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 accordingly.
Chapter 4 focuses on such aspects of edge security as authentication and
authorisation of end-users at the edge of the deployment and preventing re-
quests from bypassing these security checks, which are typically handled by
an API gateway or a dedicated edge service. Implementing authentication
and authorisation at the API gateway level requires a trade-off among se-
curity, performance and complexity. After the request is authenticated as
coming from a specific end-user, it needs to be authorised. On a high level,
there exist three approaches to handling end-user authorisation in the mi-
croservice architecture: performing all the checks at the edge; performing
coarse-grained authorisation at the edge and fine-grained authentication at
the service level; and performing all the checks at the service level. Since im-
plementing fine-grained security checks solely at the edge of the deployment
is complicated and insufficient for zero trust security, microservices typically
take the dual approach. The two commonly applied authorisation patterns
suggest either enforcing coarse-grained RBAC policies at the edge and more
fine-grained AC policies at the service level or enforcing ABAC policies both
at the edge and at the service level. The latter approach is adopted, for
example, by Atlassian and Pinterest. Implementing ABAC is made more
straightforward with emerging policy engines such as OPA. The use of such
engines also fosters better separation of concerns since the decision making
can be offloaded to a separate service. Access to the microservices behind the
API gateway is typically restricted using mTLS, firewalls, or a combination
of both.
After the API gateway reaches the positive authorisation decision, the
information about the end-user needs to be sent to the underlying microser-
vices. To adhere to the principles of zero trust security, this must be done in
a cryptographically secure manner. In addition, each microservice must be
able to pass the identity of the end-user to a microservice it invokes, which
in turn must be able to verify both the claims about the identity of the end-
user and the identity of the calling microservice. In other words, securing a
microservice at the service level requires reliably verifying the identities of
both the end-user and the upstream microservice.
Chapter 5 focuses on such aspects of zero trust security as authentication
and authorisation of end-users and peer-services at the service-level. Au-
thentication and authorisation can be implemented within the service itself
or offloaded to a sidecar, which, together with other sidecars, can form the
data plane of a service mesh. The latter allows for separation of concerns,
reuse, centralised policy management and scalable policy distribution at the
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platform layer. Whilst other options exist, JWT and mTLS are de facto
industry standards for end-user and service-to-service authentication accord-
ingly. When offloaded to a sidecar, end-user authorisation often relies on a
policy engine such as OPA. The same sidecar can also handle peer service
authorisation. Alternatively, service-to-service AC policies can be defined
in the form of an ACL, which allows for extremely fine-grained AC. The
use of ACLs is possible due to a relatively small number of microservices in
the deployment. However, even if the number of services does not exceed a
thousand, manually whitelisting microservices poses a cumbersome and error-
prone task. Thus, it requires a high level of automation. Monzo describes in
great detail how they make this process nearly fully automated. However, the
same approach would not be possible if their microservices were built using
different technological stacks. As future work, different approaches for com-
piling the ACL for peer services in a heterogeneous microservice architecture
can be investigated.
Finally, Chapter 6 describes a case study where we took the first steps of
migrating a monolith to microservices, which included extracting the identity
service from the monolith. The resulting architecture might not be considered
a microservice application but rather a strangler fig application, since most
of its functionality remains in the monolith. The resulting architecture is
evaluated based on the knowledge accumulated in Chapters 4 to 5 of the
thesis. The main achievement of this first step is the improved readiness of
the application for DevOps.
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def r e q u i r e s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n ( f ) :
@wraps ( f )
def wrap (∗ args , ∗∗kwargs ) :
user = g e t u s e r o r n o n e ( r eque s t )
i f user i s not None :
i f kwargs i s not None :
kwargs [ ’ user ’ ] = user
return f (∗ args , ∗∗kwargs )
<...>
return wrap
def g e t u s e r o r n o n e ( req ) :
try :
token = req . c o o k i e s [ ’ accessToken ’ ]
payload = jwt . decode ( token , key=SECRET JWT, a lgor i thms =[ ’ RS256 ’ ] )
return User ( payload [ ’ f i r stName ’ ] , < . . .>) i f payload else None
except KeyError : # The cook ie i s miss ing .
return None




@exerc i s e s bp . route ( ’/<eid>/check/<pid> ’ , methods=[ ’POST ’ ] )
@ r e q u i r e s a u t h e n t i c a t i o n
def e v a l u a t e e x e r c i s e ( e id , pid , user ) :
<...>
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